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Abstract 
In this paper we examine the current state of play with regards to the security of smart city 
initiatives. Smart city technologies are promoted as an effective way to counter and manage 
uncertainty and urban risks through the effective and efficient delivery of services, yet 
paradoxically they create new vulnerabilities and threats, including making city infrastructure 
and services insecure, brittle, and open to extended forms of criminal activity. This paradox 
has largely been ignored or underestimated by commercial and governmental interests or 
tackled through a technically-mediated mitigation approach. We identify five forms of 
vulnerabilities with respect to smart city technologies, detail the present extent of 
cyberattacks on networked infrastructure and services, and present a number of illustrative 
examples. We then adopt a normative approach to explore existing mitigation strategies, 
suggesting a wider set of systemic interventions (including security-by-design, remedial 
security patching and replacement, formation of core security and computer emergency 
response teams, a change in procurement procedures, and continuing professional 
development). We discuss how this approach might be enacted and enforced through market-
led and regulation/management measures, and examine a more radical preventative approach 
to security.  
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Introduction 
Over the past two decades there has been a concerted move to network urban infrastructures 
to utilise computation to try and solve urban problems and deliver city services more 
efficiently. Such endeavours are now encapsulated within the notion of smart cities, a world-
wide movement that seeks to transform urban governance, management and living through 
the use of new networked digital technologies. For advocates, the creation of smart cities will 
help address issues of urban resilience and sustainability in a time of rapidly increasing 
population, environmental change, and fiscal austerity (see Söderström et al., 2014; White, 
2016). In other words, smart city technologies are seen to offer an effective way to counter 
and manage uncertainty and risk. However, as with previous rounds of technological 
adoption and adaptation in cities (such as those related to energy supply, transportation 
systems, communication services), a number of commentators have noted that they also 
create a paradoxical situation wherein the promised benefits (such as convenience, economic 
prosperity, safety, sustainability) are accompanied by unintended consequences and new 
variances of traditional problems (e.g., reproducing inequality, creating security and criminal 
risks, environmental externalities) (see Datta 2015; Greenfield, 2013; Singh & Pelton, 2013; 
Townsend, 2013). This paradoxical  relationship and the reproduction of urban problems and 
risks in a new guise is for the most part ignored in the promotional discourse for smart cities 
driven by commercial and governmental interests or is present as a potential new issue to be 
‘solved’ by a further round of technological innovation and capital spending.  
In contrast, in this paper we examine this paradoxical relationship in depth, detailing 
how smart city technologies designed to produce urban resilience and reduce risks are 
actually opening up the urban systems they are meant to augment to new forms of 
vulnerability and risk. In particular, we are interested in considering the balancing point 
between reward and risk when previously relatively ‘dumb’ systems are made ‘smart’ 
through the introduction of networked computation, and are thus opened up to software bugs, 
computer glitches, network viruses, hacks and criminal and terrorist enterprise (Little, 2010 
Kitchin & Dodge, 2011; Townsend, 2013; Cerrudo, 2015). We are especially interested in 
security vulnerabilities and the extent to which it is becoming possible to hack and disrupt 
smart city technologies and to commit new variances of criminal activity. 
 As the burgeoning literature on crime and the city details, for as long as there have 
been urban societies there has been criminal activity and attempts to penetrate,  attack, 
defraud and disrupt city infrastructure and public services (Evans and Herbert, 1989; LeBeau 
& Leitner, 2011; Hall, 2012). Attempts to limit and defend against such crimes have become 
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built into the fabric of cities themselves through architecturally-enacted defences, strong 
doors, locks, window grills, high walls and fences, security alarms, and CCTV (Manaugh, 
2016). However, history has shown that all these security measures have some vulnerabilities 
that criminals are quick to identify and exploit. With time all security, even sophisticated or 
well-designed solutions, will be defeated (especially if the reward of success provides 
sufficient motivation). There is thus a perennial struggle between defenders and attackers to 
secure systems that provide adequate protection but are not so restrictive that they seriously 
inconvenience users or inhibit essential economic transactions.  
Smart city technologies are no different being afflicted with a range of security 
vulnerabilities and risks and an on-going struggle is now evident between the cybersecurity 
industry and criminals and variously-motivated hackers. However, while the base motivations 
to break into these systems might remain timeless (e.g., theft, impersonation, vandalism, 
malicious attack; see Schneier, 2003), the nature of their performance is different. Because 
smart city technologies rely on networked digital computation, exploits of their 
vulnerabilities can be undertaken at distance and attacks can be masked, reducing the risk of 
detection and capture for perpetrators. Moreover, the use of software tools to automate 
hacking has greatly lowered-costs and ‘super-empowered’ individual actors to conduct virtual 
criminality against multiple targets simultaneously, potentially impacting many different 
cities. Unauthorised access is often made easier because the so-called ‘attack surfaces’ – the 
set of ways that a system might be susceptible to an attack (Bellovin, 2016) -  are multiplied 
due to a system’s many interlocking parts, which are owned and controlled by a diverse set of 
stakeholders, making it difficult to secure every aspect of a large infrastructure or utility 
network (Article 29 DPWP, 2014; Cerrudo, 2015; Durbin, 2015). The rewards for success 
can also be significant, for example in the case of a data breach providing access to millions 
of user details, or in the case of vandalism/terrorism shutting down the entire electricity 
supply to a city, and can garner large amounts of publicity. 
 In the first part of the paper we detail the various security vulnerabilities of smart 
cities and their associated risks, providing contemporary illustrative examples from European 
and North American cities. In second part we chart the ways in which these vulnerabilities 
and risks are being tackled through mitigation strategies, how these strategies might be 
further encouraged and complemented by market-based and governance-based incentives and 
regulation, and consider a more radical preventative strategy. Our approach is normative. 
Rather than providing another critique of the smart city, this time by charting the paradoxical 
situation in which technologies designed to tackle urban problems are introducing new 
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vulnerabilities and risks, or seeking to frame such risks within the discourses of the risk 
society (Beck, 1992) or urban resilience (Mackinnon & Derickson, 2013), we are more 
interested in examining the security challenges and threats faced by cities today and over the 
coming decade and how they might be more effectively mitigated and prevented. Our 
approach is guided by a recognition that the use of software systems and networked 
technologies to manage and govern cities is firmly established and is only likely to become 
more entrenched, and the need for a coherent approach to security that extends beyond 
technical solutions. 
 
Security vulnerabilities and risks of smart cities 
 
There are two key security risks with respect to the emergence of smart cities. The first is the 
security of newly installed ‘intelligent’ technologies and ‘smart’ upgrades to existing 
infrastructures and systems and the extent to which these are vulnerable to being hacked. The 
second is the security of the data generated, stored and shared across such technologies and 
infrastructures. The latter is directly related to the former as improper access to data is often 
achieved via security weaknesses in a system’s components, architecture and operation. In 
this sense, information security (data protection) has converged with operational security 
(making sure things work reliably and with integrity). Here, we are most interested in the 
vulnerabilities of city infrastructures and systems rather than data security per se; that is, the 
extent to which their operation can be compromised and functioning disrupted.  
The principal means of compromising a smart city technology is through cyberattacks 
that seek to ‘alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade or destroy computer systems and networks or the 
information and/or programs resident in or transiting these systems or networks’ (Owens et 
al., 2009: 1). There are three distinct forms of cyberattack against operational systems: 
availability attacks that seek to close a system down or deny service use; confidentiality 
attacks that seek to extract information and monitor activity; and integrity attacks that seek to 
enter a system to alter information and settings (such as changing settings so that components 
exceed normal performance, erasing critical software, planting malware and viruses) (Singer 
& Friedman, 2014). Cyberattacks can be performed by multiple different actors, from nation 
state intelligence agencies and militaries, terrorist groups, organised criminals, hacker 
collectives, political and socially motivated activists to ‘lone wolf’ hackers, ‘script kiddies’ 
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and bored teenagers1. Former FBI Director, Robert Mueller, has claimed that 108 nations 
have government funded and directed cyberattack units, targeting critical infrastructure and 
industrial secrets (Goodman, 2015). Anecdotal evidence from media reporting indicates a 
significant ramping up of organised criminals conducting thefts and frauds by targeting 
online systems, including spate of so-called ‘randomware’ attacks against organisations 
(Hern, 2016). 
In general, cyberattacks seek to exploit one of five major vulnerabilities of digital 
technologies that are central to smart city systems. The first of these is weak software security 
and data encryption.  Research by a Carnegie Mellon University team in 2004 detailed that, 
on average, there are 30 errors or possibly exploitable bugs for every 1000 lines of code (Li et 
al., 2004). In typical large systems being deployed in cities there are millions of lines of code 
that produces thousands of potential zero-day exploits (as yet unknown security 
vulnerabilities) for network viruses, malware and directed hacks. Research by cybersecurity 
specialists has detailed how many smart city systems have been constructed with no or 
minimal security (Cerrudo, 2015). For example, using the Shodan search engine 
(www.shodan.io see Bodenheim et al., 2014) it is possible to find all kinds of devices and 
control systems connected to the internet – from networked thermostats for heating systems 
to traffic control systems and command-and-control centres for nuclear power plants – many 
of which have been found to have little to no security (such as no user authenication, or using 
default or weak passwords, e.g., ‘admin’, ‘1234’). Moreover, city governments and vendors 
of smart city technologies often deploy them without undertaking cybersecurity testing 
(Cerrudo, 2015). In the case of some ‘Internet of Things’ (IoT)2 deployments, it can be 
difficult to ensure end-to-end security because most sensors and low-powered devices on the 
market do not have sufficient computing power to support an encrypted network link (Article 
29 DPWP, 2014). Where encryption is used, security issues can arise due to how it is 
operated (Cerrudo, 2015).  
The second area of vulnerability is due to the use of insecure legacy systems and poor 
maintenance. Many smart city technologies are layered onto much older infrastructure that 
relies on software and technology created 20 or 30 years ago, which has not been upgraded 
                                                          
1 Computer hacking culture has a long history and with diverse and contested meanings (Levy, 1984), but the 
term has come typically to be applied to those with malicious or criminal intent. 
2 The IoT is a fast developing set of identification and technologies that connect together formally ‘dumb’ 
physical objects and make them addressable through the internet and potential facilitate all manner of new 
activities and processes in relation to these objects, often in highly automated and autonomous fashion. As such 
IoT is critical element in creation of what Dodge and Kitchin (2005) called the ‘machine-readable world’. 
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for some time, nor can they be migrated to newer, more secure systems (Rainie et al., 2014; 
Cerrudo, 2015). These technologies can create inherent vulnerabilities to newer systems by 
providing so-called ‘forever-day exploits’ (holes in legacy software products that vendors no 
longer support and thus will never be patched) (Townsend, 2013). Even in the case of newer 
technologies, it can be difficult to test and rollout patches onto critical operational systems 
that need to always be on (Cerrudo, 2015).  
The third vulnerability is that smart city systems are typically large, complex and 
diverse, with many interdependencies and large and complex attack surfaces. Such 
complexity means it can be difficult to know what and how all the components are exposed, 
to measure and mitigate risks, and to ensure end-to-end security (Article 29 DPWP, 2014; 
Cerrudo, 2015; Durbin, 2015). Even if independent systems are secure, linking them to other 
systems can potentially open them to risk with the level of security only guaranteed by the 
weakest link. Moreover, the interdependencies between technologies and systems mean that 
they are harder to maintain and upgrade (Sarma, 2015). Beyond being hacked, the complexity 
of systems also increases the chances of ‘normal accidents’ (e.g., programming bugs, human 
errors) that cause unanticipated failures (Perrow, 1984; Townsend, 2013).  
The interdependencies between smart city technologies and systems have the potential 
to create cascade effects, wherein ‘highly interconnected entities rapidly transmit adverse 
consequences to each other’ (Durbin, 2015, no pagination; see also Little, 2010). For 
example, a cyberattack on an electrical power infrastructure could cascade into an urban 
operating system that then cascades into the other systems such as traffic management, 
emergency services, and water services. Indeed, this is one of the key security and resilience 
risks of an urban operating system, wherein several systems are linked together to enable a 
‘system of systems’ approach to managing city services and infrastructures thus undoing the 
mitigating effects of using a siloed approach (i.e. fully separate system with physically 
independent cabling and sources of power, etc.) (Little, 2011). A successful cyberattack on 
the electricity grid has huge cascade effects as it underpins so many activities such as 
powering homes, workplace, and a plethora of other essential infrastructure, and so on. For 
example, a sophisticated cyberattack on the software controlling parts of Ukraine’s electricity 
grid switched off the power to about a quarter of a million consumers for several hours in 
December 2015 (Zetter, 2016). 
Finally, there are multiple vulnerabilities arising from human error and deliberate 
malfeasance of disgruntled (ex)employees. Technical exploits can be significantly aided by 
human error, for example, employees opening phishing emails and installing viruses or 
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malware, or naively inserting infected datasticks into computers (Singer and Friedman, 
2014). In other cases, appropriate security software is not installed or is configured 
incorrectly, or manufacturer installed codes are not changed or system security is not kept up-
to-date (Cerrudo, 2015).  There are weaknesses in software system designs such that they can 
be easily and surreptitiously sabotaged by disgruntled present and ex-employees. For 
example, Goodman (2015) details a case where an ex-employee altered the database records 
of a vehicle retailer who were using GPS trackers and remote control boxes to re-possess 
cars, randomly disabling cars and setting off their alarms. In addition, criminal hackers are 
adept at social exploits on trusted employees such as using phishing to release key 
information (e.g., usernames and passwords) that facilitate access. There is also evidence 
from the Snowden revelations that ‘insiders’ have been planted by State intelligence agencies 
with view to deliberately compromising the design of networking hardware and fundamental 
system parameters to facilitate electronic espionage, sabotage and cyber-warfare (Greenwald, 
2014). 
These vulnerabilities are exacerbated by a number of factors in relation to urban 
management. Cities and local council are under increasing pressure for year-on-year 
‘efficiency’ savings. This affects security in three ways. First, there is long-term under-
investment in infrastructure maintenance and an over-reliance on legacy systems. Second, 
depression of salaries in most public sector organisations make it more difficult to recruit and 
retain skilled and motivated IT staff to properly implement and maintain smart city 
technologies. Crucial IT maintenance increasingly uses self-employed contractors and 
outsourced services, on the one hand deskilling core capacities and eroding institutional 
memory in the public sector, and on the other creating distributed accountability with a 
fractured set of bodies (with contracted services, service-level agreements, multi-agencies 
teams, remote helpdesks) overseeing security, which often leads to a lack of continuity, 
coordination and responsibility. Third, there is a lack of investment in dedicated 
cybersecurity personnel and leadership (in the form of Chief Information Officer or Chief 
Technology Officer) and Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) in city 
governments (Cerrudo, 2015). Cybersecurity expertise is usually limited to a handful of 
personnel and training across the wider workforce is limited or non-existent (increasing the 
likelihood of human error). Any cybersecurity plans cities do possess are often siloed with 
respect to particular systems and departments so that cross-function assessment and response 
is lacking (Cerrudo, 2015). In addition, it is clear that many smart city vendors have little or 
no experience in embedding security features into their products – despite claims made in 
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their marketing literature - and many systems possess significant vulnerabilities (Cerrudo, 
2015; Lomas, 2015). Furthermore, these vendors can impede security research by limiting 
access to their systems for testing, enabling them to continue to release unsecured products 
without oversight or accountability (Cerrudo, 2015). Further, too many cities have been lax in 
insisting on strong security controls and response within the procurement process for new 
systems.  
Collectively, security vulnerabilities mean that cyberattacks on important urban 
infrastructure and city management systems have been increasing with implications for 
human safety and security. In 2016, the Chief Information Security Officer for the City of 
San Diego government reported that their systems were being hit by an average of 60,000 
cyberattacks a day (Anand, 2016). The operators of the electricity supply grid in the United 
States report being under near constant cyberattack, with one utility recording that it was the 
target of approximately 10,000 cyberattacks each month (Markey and Waxman, 2013). 
Indeed, all five Commissioners of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission agree that 
sustained and persistent cyberattacks against the digital infrastructure controlling the supply 
grid is the most serious threat to electricity reliability in American metropolitan areas 
(Markey and Waxman, 2013). Likewise, the Israel Electric Corp. reports that its servers 
register about 6,000 unique computer attacks every second, with other critical infrastructure 
also under continuous attempts to gain access (Paganini, 2013). Many of these cyberattacks 
are relatively inconsequential, such as randomly directed probes of connected computers and 
scans across publicly available internet addresses, and are unsuccessful. However, a small 
number are much more significant and involve a security breach. Between 2010 and 2014, 
the US Department of Energy (that oversees the power grid, regulate power generation, as 
well as managing the nuclear weapons arsenal) documented 1,131 cyberattacks, of which 159 
were successful (Reilly, 2015). In 53 cases, these attacks were ‘root compromises’, meaning 
that the attackers gained administrative privileges to computer systems, stealing various kinds 
of personnel and operational information, and potentially doing other damage (Reilly, 2015). 
In a 2014 study of nearly 600 utility, oil and gas, and manufacturing companies, about 70% 
reported at least one security breach that led to the loss of confidential information or 
disruption of operations in the previous 12 months (Prince, 2014); 78% expected a successful 
attack on their ICS (industrial control systems) or SCADA (supervisory control and data 
acquisition) systems in the next two years (Prince, 2014). The trends in data and opinions of 
informed commentators is that frequency, volume and severity of cyberattacks is only going 
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to increase. Moreover, it is evident that sophistication of attacks is outpacing the quality and 
depth of defences. 
Similarly, there have been a number of cyberattacks on transport management 
systems in recent years, as well as proof-of-concept demonstrations of possible attacks. While 
the idea of crippling a city by disrupting the flow of traffic through computerised 
infrastructure is not new – for example, it was a central plot device in the 1969 heist movie, 
The Italian Job – but it can now be done remotely and is harder to defend against. For 
example, a cyberattack on a key toll road in Haifa, Israel, closed it for eight hours causing 
major traffic disruption (Paganini, 2013). A ransomware attack on the San Francisco 
municipal rail network led to ticketing machines being removed from service for two days 
(Gibbs, 2016). A research team from the University of Michigan managed to hack and 
manipulate more than a thousand wireless-accessible traffic signals in one city using a laptop, 
custom-software and a directional radio transmitter (Ghena et al., 2014). Likewise, security 
consultants IOActive Labs have hacked traffic control sensors widely used around the world 
and altered traffic light sequencing and interactive speed and road signs (Cerrudo, 2014). A 
teenager in Lodz, Poland, managed to hack the city tram switches, causing four trams to 
derail and injuring a number of passengers (Nanni, 2013; Goodman, 2015). In the US, air 
traffic control systems have been hacked, Federal Aviation Administration servers 
compromised, and malicious code installed onto control networks, and the personal 
information of 58,000 workers stolen (Goodman, 2015). Vehicles are also open to being 
hacked given that a new car contains up to 200 sensors connected to around 40 electronic 
control units and can connect to wireless networks (Greenburg, 2015). 
Every type of smart city solution and particular system components, including 
SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) systems, the sensors and microcontrollers 
of the Internet of Things, and network routers and telecommunication switches, are open to 
various forms of cyberattack.  All essential urban services including the electricity grid, water 
supply, and road traffic control rely on SCADA systems that are used to control functions and 
material flows. These systems measure how an infrastructure is performing in real-time and 
enable either automated or human operator interventions to change settings. The 
implementation of SCADA systems can be traced back to the 1920s, but were extensively 
rolled out in the 1980s. As a consequence, many deployments are quite dated and contain 
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‘forever-day’ exploits3. A number of SCADA systems have been compromised, with hackers 
altering how the infrastructure performs, or causing a denial-of-service, or have stolen data. 
The most infamous SCADA hack to date was the 2009 Stuxnet attack on Iran’s uranium 
enrichment plant in which the system was infected by malware that destroyed a number of 
centrifuges by running them beyond their design specifications. By 2010 over 90,000 Stuxnet 
infections were reported in 115 countries (Zetter, 2015).  
The Internet of Things (IoT) refers to the connecting together of machine-readable, 
uniquely identifiable objects through the Internet such that they can communicate largely 
autonomously and automatically. Some objects are passive and can simply be scanned or 
sensed (such as smart cards with embedded RFID chips4 used to access buildings and 
transport systems). Others are more active and include microcontrollers and actuators. All 
kinds of objects that used to be ‘dumb’, such as thermostats, domestic appliances security 
cameras, lighting systems (where the individual bulbs are addressable) are now becoming 
networked and ‘smart’, generating information about their use and becoming controllable 
from a distance. The security of the Internet of Things is highly variable, with some systems 
lacking encryption or usernames and passwords, and others open to infection by malware and 
firmware modification. The complex interdependencies of IoT mean that it has a large attack 
surface and multiple vulnerabilities (see Table 1). Demonstrating the scale of IoT 
vulnerability, one  provocative project, Insecam.org provides access to the feeds of thousands 
of  unsecured secured cameras available on the public internet from cities across the world 
(Cox, 2014) (see Figure 1). These cameras can also be turned off, with some lacking the 
function to be restarted remotely (Cerrudo, 2015). Others researchers have shown how to 
hack into smart lighting and take over control, with potentially serious consequences for 
personal safety (Chacos, 2016). In addition, IoT infrastructure can be used to perform other 
kinds of hacks, as with the Dyn denial of service attacks in autumn of 2016 in which many 
significant websites were disrupted by the Mirai botnet that took over unsecured IoT devices 
and used them to bombard Dyn servers (Woolf, 2016).  
 
                                                          
3 This is a publicly known code error in a software product that the vendor is not able to or is not intending to 
fix, consequently there is no means of patching the software. 
 
4 These comprise a small physical electronic circuit and antenna that can be fix to physical objects and 
automatically broadcast a globally unique identification code number when queried by appropriate radio signal, 
see Frith, 2015.  
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Figure 1. A demonstration of global cybersecurity issues in terms of open security video 
feeds and webcams on the Internet. (Source: Authors’ screenshot of insecam.org) 
 
 
 
 
 
Smart city technologies are linked together via a number of communications 
technologies and protocols such as 4G LTE (Long Term Evolution), GSM (Global System 
for Mobile communication), CDMA (Code Division Multiple Access), WiFi, bluetooth, , 
NFC (Near-Field Communication), ZigBee (open wireless standard), and Z-Wave (wireless 
communication). Each of the modes of networking and transferring data are known to have 
security issues that enable data to be intercepted by third parties and provide unauthorised 
access to devices. Some of these protocols are so complicated that they have are difficult to 
implement securely. Likewise, telecommunication switches that link together the local and 
long distance Internet infrastructure are known to have vulnerabilities, including 
manufacturer and operator back-door security access and access codes that are infrequently 
updated (Singh & Pelton, 2013). In addition, due to ‘oversubscribing’, wherein wireless 
carriers want to maximize use of spectrum licenses, networks only have capacity for a 
fraction of subscribers meaning that during a crisis when demand surges the system cannot 
cope, failing to connect both people and things (Townsend, 2013).  
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Table 1: The dimensions of risk with Internet of Things technologies related to the 
multiple attack surfaces and scale of potentially vulnerabilities exposed 
 
Attack Surface Vulnerability Attack Surface Vulnerability 
Ecosystem 
Access Control 
Implicit trust between 
components 
Enrolment security 
Decommissioning system 
Lost access procedures 
Local Data 
Storage 
Unencrypted data 
Data encrypted with discovered 
keys 
Lack of data integrity checks 
Device Memory Cleartext usernames 
Cleartext passwords 
Third-party credentials 
Encryption keys 
Third-party 
Backend APIs 
Unencrypted PII sent 
Encrypted PII sent 
Device information leaked 
Location leaked 
Device Physical 
Interfaces 
Firmware extraction 
User command line interface 
Administrative command line 
interface 
Privilege escalation 
Reset to insecure state 
Removal of storage media 
Vendor Backend 
APIs 
Inherent trust of cloud or mobile 
application 
Weak authentication 
Weak access controls 
Injection attacks 
Device Web 
Interface 
SQL injection 
Cross-site scripting 
Cross-site Request Forgery 
Username enumeration 
Weak passwords 
Account lockout 
Known default credentials 
Update 
Mechanism 
Update sent without encryption 
Updates not signed 
Update location writable 
Update verification 
Malicious update 
Missing update mechanism 
No manual update mechanism 
Device Firmware Hardcoded credentials 
Sensitive information disclosure 
Sensitive URL disclosure 
Encryption keys 
Firmware version display and/or 
last update date 
Ecosystem 
Communication 
Health checks 
Heartbeats 
Ecosystem commands 
Deprovisioning 
Pushing updates 
Device Network 
Services 
Information disclosure 
User command line interface 
Administrative command line 
interface 
Injection 
Denial of Service 
Unencrypted Services 
Poorly implemented encryption 
Test/Development Services 
Buffer Overflow 
UPnP 
Vulnerable UDP Services 
DoS 
Mobile 
Application 
Implicitly trusted by device or 
cloud 
Username enumeration 
Account lockout 
Known default credentials 
Weak passwords 
Insecure data storage 
Transport encryption 
Insecure password recovery 
mechanism 
Two-factor authentication 
Administrative 
Interface 
SQL injection 
Cross-site scripting 
Cross-site Request Forgery 
Username enumeration 
Weak passwords 
Account lockout 
Known default credentials 
Security/encryption options 
Logging options 
Two-factor authentication 
Inability to wipe device 
Cloud Web 
Interface 
SQL injection 
Cross-site scripting 
Cross-site Request Forgery 
Username enumeration 
Weak passwords 
Account lockout 
Known default credentials 
Transport encryption 
Insecure password recovery 
mechanism 
Two-factor authentication 
Network Traffic LAN   
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LAN to Internet 
Short range 
Non-standard 
Source: Adapted from Open Web Application Security Project, 2015. 
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/IoT_Attack_Surface_Areas (CC-BY) 
 
 
Securing smart cities: mitigation and preventative   
It is clear that smart city technologies currently being deployed have multiple vulnerabilities 
and that these will be exploited for various ends. A key question therefore concerns how such 
vulnerabilities can be addressed to minimize threats and risk? To date, the strategy adopted 
has largely been one of conventional, largely technical mitigation solutions, such as access 
controls, encryption, IT industry standards and security protocols, and software patching 
regimes, along with staff training. While this has had some effect, we contend that the 
securing of smart cities is becoming of such significance to urban living that it requires a 
wider set of systemic interventions that encompass mitigation (lessening the force or intensity 
of something occurring) and prevention (stopping something from happening or arising), and 
ensures enactment through both market-led initiatives and governance-led regulation and 
enforcement.   
  
Conventional mitigation solutions 
As noted, smart city technologies typically present large attack surfaces that expose a number 
of potential vulnerabilities, especially in control systems that contain legacy components 
using old software which has not been regularly patched. The typical approach to securing 
smart city systems has been to utilise a suite of well-known technical solutions and software 
security approaches to try and prevent access and to enable restoration if a compromise 
occurs. For example, the use of access controls (username/password, two-stage 
authentication, biometric identifiers), properly maintained firewalls, virus and malware 
checkers, end-to-end strong encryption, , and  procedures to ensure routine software patching 
and ability to respond with urgent updates to close exploits as they occur, audit trails of usage 
and change logs, and effective offsite backups and emergency recovery plans (see Table 2). 
Using these techniques, the aim is to reduce the attack surface as much as possible and to 
make the surface that is visible as robust and resilient as possible; and quickly recoverable in 
case of failure. However, the extent to which this suite of protections is available varies 
across technologies and vendors; and the application across different institutions and 
companies is also inconsistent. Moreover, in complex, distributed systems with many 
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components these solutions need to work equally across the complete system since the whole 
infrastructure/enterprise is only as strong as the weakest link. Further, it is often the case that 
these kinds of solutions are layered on after a system has been developed rather than being 
‘baked-into’ the design.  
These technical solutions are often bolstered by vigilant IT staff whose job it is to 
oversee the day-to-day maintenance of these systems, including monitoring security issues 
and reacting swiftly to new cyberattacks and breaches. In addition, non IT-staff across an 
organization can be trained to maintain good practices with respect to security, such as 
changing default and adopting stronger passwords, routinely updating software, encrypting 
files, and avoiding phishing attacks. However, training is often conducted only once and 
ongoing staff compliance with best practice is not monitored.  
 
Table 2: Standard technical aspects of software system security 
 
Access Updating Functionality Design 
Effective end-to-end 
encryption on all 
communications 
Up-to-date virus and 
malware checkers 
 
Disabling unnecessary 
functionality 
Isolating trusted 
resources from non-
trusted  
Enforce strong 
passwords and access 
controls  
 
Automatically installing 
security patch updates 
on all components, 
including firmware, 
software, 
communications, and 
interfaces 
Ensuring full backup of 
data and recovery 
mechanisms 
Ensuring that there are 
no weak links between 
components 
 
Firewalls   Implementing fail safe 
and manual overrides 
on all systems 
Audit trails    
 
Source: Authors, derived from Martínez-Ballesté et al. (2013) and Cerrudo (2015). 
 
 
While these security measures have genuine utility, they are far from a complete 
solution, particularly as smart technologies become ever more critical to smooth functioning 
of cities. Instead, a more systemic approach needs to be adopted in relation to both technical 
design and training. In particular, a security-by-design approach that is proactive and 
preventative, rather than reactive and remedial, needs to be employed by city governments 
and key institutions responsible for urban management and infrastructure provision. Security-
by-design seeks to build strong security measures into systems from the outset rather than 
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attempting to layer them on after initial development. This requires security risk assessment 
to be a fundamental part of the design process and all aspects of security systems to be 
rigorously tested before the product is sold (Lomas, 2015); including a pilot phase within a 
living lab environment that includes testing the security of a product when deployed in real-
world contexts and operating as part of a wider network of technologies (to ensure end-to-end 
security). It also means having in place an on-going commitment to cybersecurity, including 
a mechanism to monitor products throughout their life cycle, a process of supporting and 
patching them over time, and a procedure for notifying customers when security risks are 
identified. With respect to existing city software systems and control infrastructure, all 
vendors should be asked for full security documentation and procedures, and a 
comprehensive testing of their security should be undertaken to identify weak points, 
undertake remedial security patching, and to upgrade future service level agreements with 
respect to enhanced security. This is especially the case for legacy systems. If systems cannot 
be remedially fixed and forever-day exploits remain that could bring down critical systems, 
then firm plans need to be put in place for upgrades or replacement. 
With respect to overseeing the security aspects of smart city technologies we would 
advocate the formation of a core security team within urban administrations with specialist 
skills and responsibilities above and beyond day-to-day IT-administration. The work of this 
team would include: undertaking wide-ranging threat and risk modelling; actively testing the 
security of smart city technologies (rather than simply monitoring and trusting vendor 
reassurances); conducting on-going security assessments; prepare and review detailed plans 
of action for different kinds of cybersecurity incidents; liaising with the city departments and 
companies administering smart city initiatives; and coordinating staff training on security 
issues. The staff would also constitute a city’s Computer Emergency Response Team to 
actively tackle any on-going cybersecurity incident (Cerrudo, 2015). As a routine part of their 
work, the core security team should consult with cybersecurity vendors to stay up-to-date on 
potential threats and solutions (Nanni, 2013). In addition, the team should create a formal 
channel for security feedback and ethical disclosure, enabling bugs and security weaknesses 
to be reported by members of the consultants, academics and allied technology companies. 
Initial security assessments would be carried out as early as possible, for example in the 
scoping and procurement phases of technological adoption, to ensure the solutions developed 
conform to expectations. Part of any assessment should be a consideration of whether 
systems should be kept in siloes to limit cascade effects. Given cost constraints and lack of 
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strategic foresight very few cities presently have core security teams or CERTs and are 
therefore underprepared to deal with a serious cyberattack. 
 In addition, a step-change in education and training vis-à-vis cybersecurity is required 
for all those involved in smart city ventures. Within local government and public service / 
infrastructure providers advanced security training should be developed and implemented 
across the organisation, but especially for those involved in the procurement, rollout and 
daily running of smart city technologies. This is important because although a system might 
have an extensive and robust set of technical security solutions these can be nullified by 
social exploits or human error. Similarly, such programmes should be instituted for 
developers and vendors to stress the need for a security-by-design approach, especially for 
start-ups and SMEs who might not have the in-house capacity for security expertise. In both 
cases, training needs to be part of a continual programme of professional development to 
refresh best practice and keep abreast of new technologies and vulnerabilities. We have found 
very little evidence of such system-wide security training programmes other than relatively 
light introductory courses, often taken on a one-off basis. 
 
Enactment and enforcement 
While it is one thing to advocate for stronger mitigation measures, it is another to ensure that 
a more systemic approach to cybersecurity for smart cities is widely enacted and enforced. 
Therefore, there is a need to think about the most appropriate mechanisms to incentivise 
participation by both the public and commercial sector, and to penalise those who fail to 
improve security of their products, systems and services. In general, there are two routes to 
improving mitigation measures: market-led adoption and government-led regulation and legal 
enforcement.  
The market-led approach consists of vendors developing smart city technologies 
taking a proactive, self-regulatory stance to security. Here, software companies choose to 
adopt security-by-design as a de facto standard, collaborate with each other to create effective 
industry-wide standards and establish best practices, and ensure security across complex, 
interdependent systems, and work more closely with the rapidly growing cybersecurity 
industry in order to improve their products. In so doing, security becomes an expected norm 
and the adoption of a serious approach to security by companies provides competitive 
advantage over those that do not comply. In part, the market-led approach would be driven by 
competition, fear of reputational damage and litigation caused by a major security scandal, 
and the benefits of self-regulation rather than a stick-approach of enforcement through legal 
17 
 
penalties and fines. While a market-led approach to security does presently exist, it 
predominately adopts the weak mitigation approach detailed above and not security-by-
design. In part this is because there is currently weak pressure from buyers for enhanced 
security, mainly due to a poor understanding of security vulnerabilities and their potential 
consequences and inadequate procurement practices. Moreover, the imperatives to get 
product to market as quickly as possible (often to pre-empt a competitor) and turn a profit 
mean that security corners are being cut. As such, market-led responses should be 
accompanied by more ‘top-down’ regulation and better management practices by city 
authorities and urban infrastructure operators. 
 The regulation and management-led approach seeks to encourage secure deployment 
of smart city technologies through compliance measures and active oversight. The former 
requires the formulation of security standards, directives and best practices that smart city 
deployments must comply with or face some form of penalty, such as prosecution, fines, and 
loss of contract. There are now a host of smart city standards initiatives underway – by bodies 
such as the International Standards Organisation, British Standards Institute, American 
National Standards Institute, City Protocol – aimed at defining minimum specifications for 
technical development and deployment of core technologies. The latter necessitates setting up 
management structures and procedures for ensuring compliance is being met and enforced. 
For example, large public bodies operating the EU have to institute an audit and risk 
committee that identifies vulnerabilities and monitors potential threats to an organisation and 
oversees mitigation strategies. These are often broad in scope and could benefit from a sub-
committee focused specifically on software security and network threats. This sub-committee 
should oversee and audit the work of the core security team; advise on the work priorities and 
programme; certify security assessments and that the city’s smart city technologies conform 
to legal and regulatory requirements; ensure that response and mitigation plans and processes 
are in place; and ensure there is clear communication to public concerning how the security 
of smart city systems (Nanni, 2013). In addition, city administrations should bake security-
by-design and on-going security maintenance (including on-time patching and 24/7 incident 
response) into the procurement process and subsequent service level contracts, with the 
extent to which the proposed solutions meet desired parameters directly influencing the 
evaluation of tenders (Cerrudo, 2015). They should also support whistle-blowers who wish to 
expose security vulnerabilities and require the public reporting of security breaches. 
We have found no example of a city that presently enacts such systemic, enhanced 
security oversight or procurement beyond seeking existing mitigation strategies. For the most 
18 
 
part this is due to a lack of in-depth knowledge and competence, and institutional inertia. 
Consequently, smart city technologies have been in the past and are still being procured with 
little coordinated consideration of security harms and slotted into existing city management in 
an ad hoc fashion with minimal strategic foresight. Given the potential harms and the 
associated costs that can arise, this piecemeal and make-do approach needs to be discontinued 
to be replaced with a more systemic and coordinated approach. 
 
A preventative approach  
Even with a strong mitigation strategy and effective enforcement procedures it is not possible 
to eradicate all the security vulnerabilities and associated risks from the smart city. There is 
therefore a case to be made for considering a preventative approach, one that involves 
building some urban infrastructure and control systems that are deliberately ‘deaf’ (not 
networked and remotely accessible) and ‘dumb’ (i.e. not automated by code), which would 
elide many software security overheads. A preventative approach is quite straightforward to 
articulate – simply put, ‘do not adopt smart city technologies as presently conceived’; the best 
way to prevent risks from materialising is not to create vulnerabilities in the first place.  
Yet making the case for such an approach is much more difficult in practice because 
of the perceived benefits of creating a smart city. Such a cautious, preventative approach, that 
questions seriously the commercial logics and profit streams of many hardware vendors and 
software developers, will be labelled ‘backward looking’ and ‘out-of-date’, and derided for 
having a neo-Luddite mentality (see Jones, 2013). Indeed, at present, advocating a 
preventative approach would be considered a radical means of securing smart cities as it 
requires a reframing of the value around technology and a rethinking of the balance between 
convenience/efficiency and security/safety. It requires a counter-narrative against ‘smarter is 
better’ and advocacy for conventional electro-mechanical components and systems that run 
reliably without additional software monitoring and network access.  
There is a case, however, to be made that the potential risks networked infrastructure 
pose, plus the cybersecurity, management and training costs of ensuring security, outweigh 
the efficiency and functionality gains promised and the ‘inconveniences’ of maintaining ‘air-
gapped’ technologies (that is, systems that are physically isolated from other networks). 
Having to send a person physically to a component to re-activate it, reconfigure settings, or 
repair it, might seem costly and burdensome when it could be done remotely. Indeed, in the 
era of ubiquitous connectivity, cloud-computing, integrated and interoperable systems, 
remote control, the notion of having an air gap in critical systems might seem counter-
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intuitive. However, it can be an effective method of security that prevents hacking and 
cascade effects and significantly reduces vulnerabilities.  
Equally, there are reasons to be sceptical of the benefits claimed by advocates (who 
are often self-interested) for new cyber-physical systems as, it is well noted that they tend to 
oversell the promises of smart city technologies while ignoring their perils (Townsend, 2013; 
Greenfield, 2013; Kitchin, 2014; Datta, 2015). Certainly many existing smart city system 
deployment have not delivered the anticipated gains in efficiency, flexibility, productivity 
and convenience; in many cases, especially with regards to the Internet of Things, objects and 
systems have been digitally networked for little perceivable gain or real benefits to the 
functioning and management of cities (though they benefit vendors through their 
sale/servicing and potential monetization of data streams). In fact, if anything some newly 
software-enabled systems make routine tasks more complex to complete, error-prone, 
unreliable, stressful, costly in time and cognitive attention, and less secure, as well as raising 
issues with respect to excessive surveillance and privacy (Greenfield, 2013; Kitchin, 2016). 
In other words, networking city infrastructure and introducing new systems do not 
necessarily improve performance, yet they do make them more vulnerable to security risks. 
Nonetheless, at present, implementing preventative measures will be difficult to 
promote and promulgate given the widespread adoption of techno-utopian discourses of 
‘progress’ enacted by smart urbanism. This is especially the case in the current neoliberal 
climate that encourages cities to form public-private partnerships with companies and to 
outsource or privatize services, and where access to government grants will be difficult 
without claiming to create and implement innovative and cutting-edge smart city solutions. 
This may change though if the ‘cutting-edge’ of city management becomes recognised as the 
‘bleeding-edge’ of insecurity.  
 
Conclusion 
In this paper we have examined in-depth the current state of play with regards to the security 
of smart cities.  In an ironic twist, smart city technologies are promoted as an effective way to 
counter and manage uncertainty and risk in present day cities, yet they paradoxically create 
new risks, including making city infrastructure and services insecure, brittle, and open to 
extensive forms of vandalism, disruption and criminal exploitation. This paradox has largely 
been ignored by commercial and governmental interests or tackled through a traditional 
mitigation approach. This is perhaps no surprise. Although we have identified five forms of 
vulnerability and detailed the present extent of cyberattacks on city infrastructure and 
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services, presenting a number of illustrative examples where they have been compromised, as 
far as is publicly known the majority of attacks are presently being repulsed using 
cybersecurity software tools and management practices, or their effects have been only 
locally disruptive or damaging but not critical for the long term delivery of services (Singer 
& Friedman, 2014). Indeed, despite wide scale low-level attempts, successful cyberattacks on 
city systems are still relatively rare and when they have occurred their effects generally last 
no more than a few hours or involve the theft of data rather than creating life threatening 
situations. That said, even short term disturbances, such as the shutting down the electricity 
grid for a few hours or causing traffic gridlock, can be an expensive disruption through lost 
productivity and opportunities, and can also be potentially life-threatening. They also signal 
the threat of more damaging cyberattacks in coming years as actors develop more 
sophisticated methods of hacking and security measures fail to keep pace.  
Indeed, it is clear that smart city technologies presently have multiple vulnerabilities 
and that these are and will be exploited for various ends. Moreover, there is a cybersecurity 
‘arms race’ underway between attackers and defenders, and it maybe that more severe 
disruption of critical infrastructure has so far been avoided because nation-state actors do not 
want to reveal their capabilities and they fear retaliation from adversaries (Rainie et al., 
2014). In other words, smart city technologies are vulnerable to cyberattack and 
cyberterrorism and existing vulnerabilities are only likely to increase in the future. In our 
view, present strategies for addressing the vulnerabilities and risks posed by the mass 
adoption of networked technologies for city management are woefully inadequate and 
predominantly rely on existing technical and training mitigation strategies and market-led 
solutions.  
Instead, we advocate a widening and deepening of mitigation strategies to include 
security-by-design as a de facto approach for all future smart city procurement, a 
comprehensive assessment of existing urban infrastructures and information systems and 
remedial security patching or replacement, the formation of core security and computer 
emergency response teams within city administrations with specialist skills and 
responsibilities beyond general IT-administration, and a step-change in security training and 
continuing professional development in both public and commercial sectors. This should be 
complemented by a management and regulation approach to smart city technologies and 
implementation, rather than simply a market-led approach, to ensure active oversight and 
compliance with security standards, best practices, municipal policy, and third-party service 
contracts. We also suggest that serious consideration is given to a preventative approach to 
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security, wherein critical infrastructure is air-gapped or not given the ‘smart’ treatment when 
it is not really needed. 
It is self-evidently too late to roll-back the smart city agenda and much of the 
adoption of smart city technologies by municipal authorities across the world cannot simply 
be removed. However, it is not too late to recognize the extent of the new security 
vulnerabilities, threats and risks posed by these technologies and to put in place strategies and 
approaches to mitigate and prevent them. We believe that not enough is presently being done 
by vendors and city administrations to identify vulnerabilities and risks and to formulate 
effective responses. Vandals, criminals and terrorists will undoubtedly continue to adapt their 
methods to exploit the layering of software dependent infrastructures throughout urban space, 
consequently much more attention needs to be focused on creating secure smart cities. 
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